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The Unintended Consequences of the Rat Race: 










Although performance pay schemes have been linked to labour market productivity, one 
unintended consequence, suggested as early as Adam Smith, is that performance pay is 
detrimental to health.  Recent research has shown that there is a positive relationship between 
performance pay and injuries on the job.  This paper focuses on the consequences of 
performance pay on health and investigates if there is a link between performance pay and self-
reported general health or specific illnesses.  Using data from the British Household Panel 
Survey, this study utilizes survival analysis to show that being in jobs with a performance pay 
element increases the likelihood of health deterioration, ceteris paribus. 
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The Unintended Consequences of the Rat Race: 
The Detrimental Effects of Performance Pay on Health 
 
 
I.  Introduction 
The economics literature suggests that there is a link between performance pay and increased 
productivity.  Thus research reveals that pay based on the performance of workers (usually in the 
form of piece rates, merit pay or similar pay-for-performance schemes) generate higher 
productivity through an increased incentive for effort or by offering incentives for more highly 
productive workers to sort themselves into these types of jobs (Lazear, 2000). 
 
However, a related literature examines the unintended consequences of such payment schemes.  
If the contract is not set up appropriately, ‘adverse specialization’ (MacDonald and Marx, 2001) 
can occur where workers perform only those aspects that are rewarded, while ignoring other 
aspects that are not.  Thus, workers may stress quantity over quality or overuse physical capital 
in order to increase production.  These unintended consequences of performance pay schemes 
have led some researchers to question whether these schemes actually increase profitability, 
despite the fact that they may increase worker productivity. 
 
An interesting and little explored potential unintended consequence of performance pay is its 
effect on health.  Adam Smith first observes in The Wealth of Nations, “Workmen … when they 
are liberally paid by the piece, are very apt to overwork themselves and to ruin their health and 
constitution in a few years” (Smith, 1776, p. 83).  Except for a limited number of studies (e.g. 
Foster and Rosenweig, 1994, and Bender et al., 2012), this observation has not been empirically 
tested, and the small literature that has examined this topic has focused very narrowly on injuries 
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at work.  In line with the original idea of Smith, the aim of this paper is to use a nationally 
representative dataset to examine the effects of performance pay on other health outcomes, 
particularly ones affected by stress. Thus, the study investigates whether increases in the length 
of time paid using performance pay negatively impact the ‘health and constitution in a few 
years’. 
 
The following section briefly reviews the literature on the unintended consequences of 
performance pay and the small set of papers that link health to performance pay.  Section III 
discusses the potential pathways that performance pay might impact health over time.  Section 
IV reviews the data and methodology.  Section V reports the results, while Section VI 
empirically examines potential pathways for the effect of performance pay on health.  A final 
section concludes the paper. 
 
II. Brief Literature Review. 
It is intuitive to think that certain job characteristics are correlated with health.  For example, 
Case and Deaton (2005) use cross sectional data to show that manual workers have worse health 
than non manual workers, even after controlling for factors such as education and income.  More 
recently, Fletcher et al. (2011) find that long exposure to adverse physical demands and 
environmental conditions in their occupations cause workers to have worse health.  However, 
most papers in this vein do not examine the effect of particular job characteristics. 
 
The literature that links health and performance pay is small and is often focused on case studies 
of particular industries or occupations.  Sundstroem-Frisk (1984) finds that accident rates among 
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Swedish loggers is lower for those paid hourly rates rather than piece rates.  Saha et al. (2004) 
investigate fertilizer production workers in India to show those on performance pay experienced 
higher workplace accidents.  Freeman and Kleiner (2005) report evidence from a US shoe 
manufacturer that piece rates are associated with higher workers compensation costs.  Toupin et 
al. (2007) report higher heart rates for Canadian loggers paid by piece rates, suggesting ‘negative 
consequences for worker health and safety.’  Several papers on over-the-road truckers in the US 
(Williamson et al. 2009, Rodriquez et al. 2006, Belman et al. 2005, and Monaco and Williams 
2000) generally find that truckers paid by the hour have smaller probabilities of being in 
accidents compared to truckers who get paid by the mile. 
 
Three papers are more closely aligned with this paper’s focus.  The first is by Foster and 
Rosenweig (1994).  Like the papers referenced above they, focus on a narrow occupation 
(subsistence farmers in the Philippines) but they link performance pay with overall health, as 
opposed to injuries on the job.  They approximate overall health by the body mass index (BMI) 
which is shown to be lower for farm workers paid piece rates, ceteris paribus.   Since these 
subsistence farmers have very low BMIs to begin, low BMI indicates worse health since. 
 
The other two papers are by Bender et al. (2012) and Artz and Heywood (2013). Both focus on 
the link between performance pay and workplace injury.  Unlike the papers discussed above, 
they consider the performance pay-injury relationship across many different occupations and 
industries.  Bender et al. (2012) use a Europe-wide cross-sectional dataset (the European 
Working Conditions Survey) to find a strongly robust relationship between workers with piece 
rates experience and higher probabilities of workplace injury, ceteris paribus.  Artz and 
5 
 
Heywood (2013) employ the US National Longitudinal Survey of Youth to find that this 
relationship exists even when controlling for individual and individual-employer fixed effects. 
 
The goal of the current paper is to extend these last papers by examining the relationship 
between performance pay experience and broad measures of health, using a nationally 
representative dataset that covers many different occupations and industries.  The difficulty with 
this approach is identifying a dataset that includes measures of performance pay and health and 
contains a wide array of microeconomic information (e.g. socio-economic data, education, 
earnings, etc).  Standard microeconomic datasets in the US such as the Current Population 
Survey, the Panel Study on Income Dynamics, and even the National Longitudinal Survey of 
Youth do not generally contain all the necessary variables.  (Indeed, this may explain, in part, the 
lack of research in the area.)  However, these data do exist for a subset of years in the British 
Household Panel Survey (BHPS) and, thus, it is this data source that provides the data for this 
study.0F1 
 
III.  Potential Pathways 
The literature above only alludes to potential pathways that might generate worse health due to 
performance pay.  Bender et al. (2012) suggest that one pathway for workplace injury is the 
increased effort caused by performance pay giving incentives to increase their speed on the job 
1 One dataset that does have these measures is the US Health and Retirement Study (HRS), but it has the 
unsatisfactory aspect of including very limited age range of 51 to 61 year olds in 1992.  Thus, it is more appropriate 
to use a survey such as the BHPS which includes workers of all ages. 
6 
 
                                                 
or take greater risks on the job.  This point is echoed in several of the papers mentioned above 
that focus on particular occupations.  
 
While the above might explain the link between performance pay and injuries on the job, other 
pathways are possible when the cumulative effects of performance pay on health are considered.  
One way is through increased stress associated with performance related pay.  This stress might 
be generated in a variety of ways.  Although not a focus of their study, Dohmen and Falk (2011, 
Table 5) analyse data from a series of experiments to find that piece rate payments generated 
both more effort and more stress and exhaustion than those paid a fixed rate, particularly after 
participants were allowed to sort into a payment scheme.  Medical evidence, such as the reviews 
by Cooper and Marshall (1976) and Blake et al. (1996) shows that this physical stress can lead to 
adverse health outcomes, both physiological (e.g. skin problems, hypertension and fatigue) and 
psychological (e.g. depressions, emotional fatigue and feelings of anxiousness).  Furthermore, 
performance related pay is generally found to be more variable than salaried or time based pay.  
This variability may induce further stress with the increased uncertainty of an income stream.1F2 
 
Another potential pathway is an implication of the view that health status is determined through 
a health production function.  This function could have many arguments, but one key aspect to 
better health is time – time spent in healthy behaviours such as exercise, learning about nutrition 
2 Of course, this would be mitigated by any compensating wage differential paid for performance related pay.  
Furthermore, there is some evidence from recent papers such as Grund and Sliwka (2010) and Cornelissen et al. 
(2011) that less risk averse workers sort into jobs that pay for performance. However, as shown below and in Artz 




                                                 
and good health, relaxation from the stress of work, cooking healthy meals etc.  Thus, health 
production is a form of household production.  If, as Lazear and others have shown, performance 
pay generates increased effort, this would imply more hours at work because the opportunity cost 
of time in healthy behaviour increases.  Therefore, there will be fewer hours available to put into 
the health production function (e.g. Mullahy and Robert, 2010). This generates worse health.  
However, the effects may not be instantaneous (as they may be if a worker takes a greater risk in 
the job and an injury immediately results). One would expect that the effects may build up over 
time as, for example, workers spend less time in exercise and gradually gain weight which, in 
turn, results to adverse health conditions such as heart disease. 
 
IV.  Methodology and Data  
There are several potential pathways that point to performance pay leading to adverse health 
outcomes but, one commonality is that any ill health from performance pay is not expected to be 
instantaneous.  Hence, one may expect that long exposure to performance pay would manifest 
itself on health over a period of time.  This indicates the need for a panel dataset rather than a 
cross sectional one, since one would want to observe the effect of performance pay on health 
over a period of time.  Thus, the focus of this study is to evaluate the impact of performance pay 
on the duration of good health spells using duration/hazard models.  Specifically, this study 
examines whether performance pay increases the hazard of falling out of good health.2F3   
 
3 This approach fits into a newer line of research that is examining such issues as the effect of unemployment on the 
duration of good health as in Cooper et al. (2008). 
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In the dataset, each individual is observed at a number of points in time. The time intervals are of 
one year of length, and so the interval boundaries are t = 1,2, 3, … and the interval t is (t-1,t].  
Thus, the dependent variable is the dummy variable indicating that at interval t, the individual 
remained in good health.  Otherwise, the spell of good health has been observed to end.  A spell 
of good health can either be complete (ci = 1) or right censored, i.e. either the individual 
continues to be in good health at the end point or the individual left the sample before the end 
point (ci = 1).  In this specification, re-entry into the panel is not allowed (since this would 
introduce problems of endogeneity), and so only a single completed or uncompleted spell for 
each individual is included. 
 
The results from estimating Cox (1972) hazard models are first presented.  Although this 
methodology is frequently used in the literature, a number of potential problems are associated 
with it in the context of this study.  First, it assumes a continuous hazard.  However, given that 
the data used here are yearly for only 10 years, a discrete hazard model might be more 
appropriate.  Second, there may be a series of unobservable characteristics that are specific to the 
worker and can affect the hazard.  This uncontrolled individual heterogeneity is called ‘frailty’ in 
the literature and can bias the estimated coefficients in the hazard regressions (see also Heckman 
and Borjas 1990 and Lancaster 1979).  Jenkins (2013, Chapter 8, p. 81) stresses the importance 
of correcting for frailty to control for “omitted variables (unobserved in the available data, or 
intrinsically unobservable such as ‘ability’)”.  Thus, this study employs the Jenkins (1995, 
2004)3F4 approach to estimating the effect of performance pay after controlling for both observable 
4  According to Jenkins, this methodology is an adaptation of a frailty correcting methodology proposed by Prentice 
and Gloeckler (1978) and modified by Meyer (1990).  This study follows the methodology as it is set out in Jenkins 
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and unobservable individual characteristics on the length of time an individual remains in good 
health. It is important to note that this methodology controls for unobserved factors either from 
the employee side (e.g. the individual’s attitude to risk) or by the employer side (e.g. 
employment relations).  Specifically it is assumed that the instantaneous hazard rate function for 
person i at time t > 0 is assumed to take the proportional hazard form: 
𝜆𝑖𝑡= 𝜆0(t)𝜀𝑖exp(𝑋𝑖𝑡΄β) =𝜆0 (t) [exp (𝑋𝑖𝑡΄β) + log( 𝜀𝑖)] (1) 
where 𝜀𝑖 is a Gamma distributed random variable with mean 1 and variance 𝜎2= ν.  Thus, the 
model incorporates a Gamma distributed random variable to take into account the frailty or 
unobserved (or omitted variable) heterogeneity between individuals, that is to control for factors 
and characteristics that are not observed by the researcher in the dataset but they affect the 
duration of the good health spell.  
 
The discrete – time hazard function for the model is  
ℎ𝑡 (𝑋𝑖𝑡) = 1- exp {-exp [𝑋𝑖𝑡΄β + 𝛾𝑡 + log( 𝜀𝑖)]}. (2) 
The log-likelihood of eq. (2) is  log 𝐿 = ∑ log {(1 − c𝑖)A𝑖 + c𝑖B𝑖}𝑁𝑖=1  (3)
 
where  
A𝑖 = �1 + 𝜈 ∑ exp�𝑋𝑖𝑗′ 𝛽 + 𝜃(𝑗)�𝑡𝑖𝑗=1 �−1/𝜐 (4) 
and  
(1995) by using the “pgmhaz8” subroutine available in STATA (Jenkins, 2004).  Note that there is a second similar 
methodology (Jenkins, 2005)) that uses discrete mixture distribution to summarize unobserved individual 
heterogeneity (hshaz) outlined in Cooper et al. (2008).  Using this methodology, the qualitative results are very 
similar to the reported results below and are available upon request.  
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B𝑖 = �1 + 𝜈 ∑ exp�𝑋𝑖𝑗′ 𝛽 + 𝜃(𝑗)�𝑡𝑖𝑗=1 �−1/𝜐 − A𝑖 , if 𝑡𝑖 > 1 (5) 
or  B𝑖 = 1 − A𝑖 , if 𝑡𝑖 = 1        (6) 
and θ(j) is a function describing duration dependence in the hazard rate (see Jenkins, 1995, for 
further details).  
 
Finally, the methodology adopted in this paper establishes the direction of causality and 
circumvents the problem of endogeneity.  In particular, the sample consists of individuals who 
have reported good health at the initial period (the start of the survey).  When the individual exits 
good health, his or her time in good health is recorded and this event should be expected to be an 
outcome of events occurring during the intervening period.  Thus, this procedure ensures that the 
direction of causality is from performance pay to health.  In addition to this, unobserved 
heterogeneity is controlled for in the Jenkins (2004) methodology. As a further robustness check, 
indicators of past bad health are included to explicitly control for the initial conditions of poor 
health. 
 
Nevertheless, one could argue that even without controlling for endogeneity, the expected 
endogeneity bias should move the coefficient towards zero.  This is because if there is sorting; 
healthier individuals would be more likely to reap higher rewards from performance pay, which 
works in the opposite way of the arguments above.  Thus, even if one does not control for 
endogeneity using the methods above, the estimates will be lower bounds of the effect of 




The data utilized in this study are from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS).  The key 
question which is used for the main independent variable is introduced in the survey in wave 
eight.  The question is, ‘Does your pay include performance related pay?’  Thus, there are ten 
waves which provide this information on performance pay for workers in wage and salary jobs 
(self-employed are excluded), since the dataset goes up to Wave 19.4F5  Because the issue at hand 
is to assess whether long exposure to performance pay generates worse health, the proportion of 
time (over the observation period) spent in performance pay is utilised.5F6   
 
This study utilises four measures of health.  The first is a measure of subjective overall health 
and is derived from the question, ‘Please think back over the last 12 months about how your 
health has been.  Compared to people of your own age, would you say that your health has on the 
whole been excellent, good, fair, poor or very poor?’  In order to specify the duration of good 
health, the following methodology is used: Individuals who report in wave eight that they are in 
5 There is a question asked every wave about whether pay has any bonus payment in it.  Estimations using this 
variable generated no statistically significant results, although ‘bonuses’ is too broad a term for the purposes of this 
study since they may or may not be based on personal performance and thus may not generate the kinds of 
behaviour which might decrease health.  Indeed this is potentially an issue for the question from which performance 
pay is identified, since it could be considered broadly to include group-based performance.  One might argue that the 
negative health effects would be less pronounced with such group-based forms of compensation which might bias 
the results to finding no effect.  That a consistent relationship is found indicates that this effect is relatively small 
compared to the effect of individually-based performance pay. 
6 A number of variations on this key variable are also used including a dummy variable for whether the respondent 
was in performance pay in the last period of observation or dummy variables of splines of the proportion of time 




                                                 
excellent or good health (and are employed in a wage and salary job in order to identify 
performance related pay) are selected.  The periods that workers who remain in this status are 
counted until workers either drop out of the survey while still in good health (perhaps because of 
non response or because of a loss of employment), continue in good health in all waves, or report 
fair, poor, or very poor health.  The first two groups are ‘censored’ observations. 
 
Three measures of physical health are also analysed – whether workers suffer from heart 
problems, stomach/digestive problems, or anxiety/depression – which are all closely aligned with 
adverse health reactions to stress.  As with subjective health, each sample starts with individuals 
who report in wave eight that they are not suffering from the respective illness.  Then periods of 
good health are counted until workers either drop out of the survey in good health or report the 
onset of the health problem. 
 
The regressions also control for standard demographic and health variables, including gender, 
education, age, current smoking status, four categories of earned income, marital status, the log 
of hours worked, broad industry and occupational indicators, and region of residence, all of 
which are measured at the time of the last observance of the respondent. 
 
V.  Results. 
A.  Survival Plots 
Figure 1 shows Kaplan-Meier survival plots for the subjective health measure by whether the 
respondent has been in performance pay less or more than 50 percent of the observation time.  
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The graph clearly shows there to be a greater hazard of falling into poor health for those in 
performance pay at least 50 percent of the time. 
 
One complicating factor to these patterns might be income.  Despite the fact that the UK has 
universal health care through the National Health Service, it is still likely that those who have 
higher income may enjoy superior health compared to lower income people.  Since performance 
pay will likely generate higher income, there could be a confounding influence of increased 
income helping keep good health survival rates higher for those paid by performance.  In Figure 
2, the sample is disaggregated by whether a worker’s earned income is above the median 
(‘highincome’=1) or below the median (‘highincome’=0).  The highest hazard is for the group of 
workers who have been in performance pay more than 50 percent of the time and have income 
below the median.  However, the negative effect of performance pay is offset somewhat by 
increased income as shown in the hazard for workers with 50 percent of time in performance pay 
and income above the median – a similar hazard to those with low income, but low exposure to 
performance pay.  The lowest hazard is for the high income and low performance pay group.  
 
Finally, Figure 3 shows the survival plots for the three objective health measures.  As with the 
subjective measures, those who are in performance pay for more than 50 percent of the time have 
lower survival probabilities, particularly if their earned income is below the median.6F7 
 
B.  Regression Results. 
7 Formal tests for equality of the survivor functions generally failed for all figures, particularly among the relatively 
low earnings group.  Results are available from the authors. 
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In addition to income there could be a variety of confounding factors driving these results.  
Hence, controlling for worker heterogeneity is important.  For the subjective health measure, the 
hazard ratios for the percentage of time spent in performance pay are reported in Table 1 for 
different econometric specifications and samples.7F8  The first column reports hazard rates from 
Cox proportional hazard regression results.  For the overall sample, increases in the percentage 
of time spent in performance pay are associated with higher odds of falling into worse health.  
Although the point estimate is statistically significant at the 1 percent level, it seems that the 
marginal impact is quite small (an increase in odds by 1.004), but this is only for a one 
percentage point rise in the percent of time for performance pay.  A one standard deviation rise 
in percent of time (about 25 percentage points) would generate much higher odds of poor health, 
with the projected hazard at 1.103.  The next column reports the odds ratio on performance pay 
using the Prentice-Gloeckler (1978) method that controls for discreteness in the hazard functions.  
As can be seen, controlling for this discreteness generates little difference in the odds ratio, 
increasing it from 1.004 to 1.005, while maintaining its statistical significance.  
 
The above regressions circumvent the problem of endogeneity.  The control for endogeneity 
comes through the set up of the sample, where the sample consists of individuals who have 
reported good health at the initial period (here in Wave 8 of the BHPS).  When the individual 
exits good health, his or her time in good health is recorded, and this event should be expected to 
be an outcome of events occurring during the intervening period.  Thus, this procedure ensures 
8 Full results for the overall sample for subjective health for the three econometric specifications are given in 
Appendix Table A1.  Generally the hazard ratios for the independent variables correspond to intuition and previous 
findings. Full results for all regressions are available from the authors. 
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that the direction of causality is from performance pay to health circumventing the problem of 
endogeneity. Nevertheless, as a robustness test a series of dummy variables of the number of 
times the worker had reported bad health in the first eight waves of the survey are included as a 
measure of the state of worker’s previous health.  As can be seen, this has no appreciable effect 
on the point estimate or statistical significance.   
 
The control for unobserved heterogeneity or frailty comes through the use of the Prentice-
Gloeckler (PG) (1978) methodology.  Interestingly this generally increases the hazard ratio.  So 
while the impact of a one percentage point increase in the amount of time spent in performance 
pay increased the odds by 1.005 times without controlling for frailty, the odds jump to 1.013 
when frailty is controlled for (or a projected hazard of 1.396 for a one standard deviation rise in 
the percent of time in performance pay).  The jump is even almost as big when previous health is 
controlled (1.004 to 1.009).  However, the pattern of performance pay correlating with worse 
health outcomes remains regardless of controlling for these frailty effects.8F9  
 
Further, Table 1 contains the results of the subjective health measure for different samples.  
There is little difference by gender for the Cox or PG without frailty regressions, and the odds 
are generally higher when frailty is controlled for all samples, although the point estimate is 
statistically insignificant for the female sample in the frailty corrected regressions.   Unlike in the 
9 However as mentioned above, even if the endogeneity is not completely circumvented, the direction of the bias is 
almost certainly towards a positive relationship between performance pay and health, since those who are generally 
more healthy will naturally be more likely to want to be paid by performance.  Thus, if one finds consistently 
negative and statistically significant relationships, in the presence of endogeneity, this implies that the regressions 
are underestimating the negative effect of performance pay on health. 
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figures, it does not seem to matter much if one is above or below median income (after 
controlling for the other covariates including income) as the hazards are nearly identical 
regardless of the estimation method.  Finally, workers in manual occupations generally have 
higher hazard ratios than workers in nonmanual occupations, ceteris paribus. 
 
Table 2 contains the hazard ratios for the percentage of time in performance pay for the three 
objective health measures by regression method and sample.  Generally, the results show that 
increased time in performance pay, ceteris paribus, leads to a higher hazard of poor health, 
typically in the 1.005 to 1.010 range for the Cox regression and from 1.008 to 1.049 for the PG 
regressions with frailty corrections.  Most, although not all, are statistically significant at least at 
the 10 percent level (only ten of 72 coefficients are not statistically significant).  Although one 
cannot directly test the difference in the hazard ratios across health groups, it seems that women 
have slightly higher hazards for both heart health and anxiety/depression where males have 
higher hazards for stomach health.  There are no consistent differences by income level for heart 
health or anxiety/depression, although higher income workers have higher hazards for stomach 
health.  Non manual workers are more susceptible to heart problems, while manual workers are 
more likely to have stomach and anxiety/depression problems.  Controls for heterogeneity (either 
by including past health or frailty controls) do not seem to affect the pattern of results in any 
appreciable manner. 
 
C.  Robustness Checks 
A series of other regressions are utilised to investigate how robust these results are.  First, even 
though the study controls for unobserved heterogeneity and endogeneity, there is still the 
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possibility of not adequately controlling for the level of risk via the workers attitude to risk.  One 
may argue that attitude to risk may affect health (e.g. Kowert and Hermann 1997; Nicholson et 
al. 2005; Khwaja et al. 2006; Lia and Liu 2008) and that risk averse workers may not opt for 
performance pay.  Although already in the regressions there are controls for some factors that are 
correlated with risk such as smoking behaviour (Viscusi 2001) and industry and occupation, 
there is no direct measure of risk attitude included in the regressors.  The BHPS does not include 
questions that provide appropriate measures of attitude to risk.  However, two variables are used 
to approximate attitude to take risk (a) have reported gambling winnings  (b) if the individual can 
be characterized as an introvert.9F10  The inclusion of either sets of controls do not affect the 
results appreciably.   
 
Second, one might be concerned about the samples used in the study.  Two issues are 
investigated.  First, given that there is only a limited panel there may be an unavoidable 
discreteness in the percentage of time spent in performance pay.  Thus, models where individuals 
are observe for at least 4 waves are estimated.  As above, the results do not change appreciably.  
Finally, a series of regressions based on a sample of only those with some performance pay – 
that is on the selected group- are estimated.  The point estimates tend to be slightly higher than 
those reported in Tables 1 and 2, but all are statistically significant and indicate that the longer 
one stays in performance pay, the higher the odds to drop into poor health10F11.   
 
10 This comes from a question in the BHPS that asks whether a person thinks that ‘Life is full of opportunities.’  
People who answer ‘No’ to this are labeled as an introvert. 
11 These results are available from the authors on request. 
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VI.  Pathways 
Overall, there seems to be consistent evidence that increases in the percentage of time in 
performance pay generates a higher hazard of falling out of good health, ceteris paribus.  
However, as discussed above, it is interesting to explore what pathways might be generating this 
effect.  One potential source might be on the amount of time available for ‘healthy’ activities.  If 
performance pay increases time spent at work, there will be fewer hours in the day, potentially, 
to engage in healthy behaviours.  Taking the sample of healthy workers from Wave 8 of the 
BHPS (the starting sample from above) and running a regression of total weekly hours (both 
regular and overtime hours) on performance pay and a series of other demographic and job 
characteristics11F12, it is found that the coefficient on performance pay is 1.29 and is significant at 
the ten percent level, meaning that workers on performance pay work almost 1.3 hours more than 
those not in performance pay.  If a sample of all workers is used, regardless of their health, the 
marginal effect is 1.5 hours, which is statistically significant at the one percent level.  
 
Unfortunately, the BHPS does not have a large array of information on the leisure activities of 
respondents. Nevertheless, for Wave 8 there is information on the amount of time participating in 
sports, participating in evening classes (including ‘keep fit’ light exercise classes), drinking, and 
eating out.  These are all five point ordered responses from ‘Never/almost never’ to ‘at least once 
a week’.  Table 3 has selected results from ordered probit estimations using Wave 8 data, both 
with the ‘Healthy Worker’ sample used in the duration analysis above, but also for ‘All Workers’ 
in Wave 8, regardless of health.  Interestingly, there seems to be little effect on some leisure 
12 Other controls include gender, education, age, age squared, marital status, currently smoking, labour income, 
occupation and region.  Regressions that include total numbers of hours, give similar results. 
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activities like participating in sports or in evening classes.  However, there is an increase in 
participation in both frequent drinking and for eating out.  While these are not necessarily 
unhealthy behaviours, dietary guidelines on both sides of the Atlantic suggest moderation in both 
drink and in the consumption of the heavier meals served in restaurants, and may be a pathway to 
the ill health found above.   
 
Another potential pathway is through increased stress which, as discussed before, the medical 
literature has linked to adverse health outcomes.  The BHPS lists several self-reported measures 
of stress through the General Health Questionnaire (GHQ), including difficulties with sleep, 
making decisions, feeling under strain, ability to overcome difficulties, loss of confidence, and 
general happiness.  As with the health outcomes above, a sample from Wave 8 of the BHPS is 
utilised where the respondents are reporting ‘low stress’ (e.g. no problems with sleep, making 
decisions, not feeling under strain, no problems with ability to overcome difficulties, no loss of 
confidence and feeling generally happy) and track these workers over the next ten waves of the 
BHPS to assert whether they report a higher stress level.  In addition, as above, this is estimated 
for the standard Cox model, as well as the PG model without and with frailty for several different 
samples. 
 
The results for these regressions are found in Table 4.  Overall the general results mimic the 
results for health – namely, that an increase in the percentage of time spent in performance pay 
increases the hazard to report more stress (across ALL stress measures) or lower happiness.  For 
sleep difficulties the Cox estimates are around 1.003 or 1.004 for all subsamples, including when 
past sleep problems (before Wave 8) are controlled for.  The hazards also increase when frailty is 
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controlled for to at least 1.016 (when past health is controlled for) and as high as 1.031 for 
manual workers.  All of the frailty controlled results are statistically significant at least at the ten 
percent level.  This pattern is remarkably consistent for each stress measure or for subjective 
measures of happiness with most Cox hazards in the 1.003 to 1.009 range and the frailty 
corrected PG hazards between 1.009 and 1.041, and except for a handful of samples, all are 
statistically significant.  While this is not a proof of a link between performance pay and health, 
it is suggestive of a pathway where performance pay may impact the health of workers.  
 
VII.  Conclusions and Future Work 
Previous research shows that performance related pay generates increased effort and productivity 
at work.  However, it may also generate a series of unintended consequences.  Observations by 
Adam Smith indicate that one such consequence might be on the health of workers, although 
little has been done to estimate whether his observation has empirical validity.  Using multiple 
waves of the BHPS and duration models, this study finds that increasing the time in which 
workers’ pay comprises at least in part of performance pay generates higher odds of falling into 
bad health – either measured by subjective health or along one of three physical health 
dimensions.  These results are very robust to variations in variables or estimation procedure. In 
addition, the estimates serve as a lower bound of the negative effect of performance pay on 
health since even if endogeneity is not perfectly captured in the regressions there will be a likely 
positive bias due to healthier workers selecting performance pay jobs. 
 
Furthermore the study investigates potential pathways in which this linkage between 
performance pay and health might lay.  While performance pay is found to increase work time, it 
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does not seem to be significantly correlated with activities designed to promote health, although 
performance pay is correlated with increases in drinking and restaurant meals.  A more 
consistent pattern is found with a series of measures of stress, where increases in the time spent 
in performance pay increase the hazard of five measures of stress.   
 
Although a very robust relationship between performance-based pay and the duration of good 
health is unearthed, there are several limitations in the paper.  First, we measure performance pay 
only broadly.  The strongest theoretical effects should come through individual-based 
performance pay, but this information is not available in the BHPS.  Similarly, one cannot 
measure the intensity of individual pay (that is, what proportion of pay is based on performance), 
meaning that the implicit assumption that any intensity of performance pay generates the same 
health outcomes is entertained when the effects are likely strongest for those whose pay is mostly 
determined by performance.  Finally, that study cannot control for changing jobs, which can also 
induce stress.  If workers are forced to change jobs that happen to have a performance pay 
aspect, there may be a stronger correlation between performance pay and ill health because of 
this job change stress.  Yet, there will also be workers who are forced to change jobs that will 
have no performance pay, and thus, it is not clear how strong this bias might be. However, the 
effects of such unobserved factors are mitigated by the frailty corrections for omitted variables 
(Jenkins, 2013). 
 
Performance pay can generate a variety of efficient labour market outcomes.  However, the 
findings here are firmly in the camp of a potential unintended consequence of performance pay 
and support the insight of Adam Smith.  Like other research that finds that performance pay can 
22 
 
lead to workers, for example, focusing on quantity rather than quantity or overusing physical 
capital, long term exposure to performance pay is related to worse health, suggesting that firms 
may face increased health insurance or workers compensation costs (e.g. Freeman and Kleiner, 
2005) and the society as a whole may bear the costs of a less productive and less healthy 
workforce with important repercussions for the health services.  Perhaps to mitigate these 
increases in costs, future research, using more detailed health data, should focus on identifying 
the pathways that performance pay can affect health. Unfortunately, the BHPS offers information 
on few and relatively crude approximations of the pathways. It may well be through increased 
stress, as suggested in the results here, but this should be more explicitly examined with more 
detailed data.  Further research may extend this argument to other forms of payment schemes.  
For example, stress and other factors that can induce ill health may increase in ‘tournaments’ 
where there is a ‘winner-take-all’ payoff, so that the effects of fierce competition for promotions 
would be an interesting extension of this research. 
 
 
Acknowledgements:  The authors are thankful for comments from participants of the 2010 
ALMR Conference, the 2012 HEALTHatWORK Conference, the 2013 Scottish Economic 
Society Conference, and seminar participants at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee and the 
Health Economics Research Unit at the University of Aberdeen as well as discussions with John 
Heywood, Colin Green and Yu Aoki. The authors are also grateful to the anonymous referees of 
this journal for their very helpful comments. 
 
The financial support of the European Commission is gratefully acknowledged 
(HEALTHatWORK project - 7th Framework Programme "THEME [HEALTH-2007-4.2-3] 





Artz, Benjamin and John S. Heywood. 2013. “Performance Pay and Workplace Injury:  US 
Survey Evidence,” University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee working paper, Milwaukee, 
Wisconsin. 
Belman, Dale L, Kristen A. Monaco and Taggert J. Brooks. 2005. Sailors of the Concrete Sea: A 
Portrait of Truck Drivers’ Work and Lives, East Lansing Michigan: Michigan State 
University Press. 
Bender, Keith A., Colin P. Green, and John S. Heywood. 2012. “Piece Rates and Workplace 
Injury: Does Survey Evidence Support Adam Smith?” Journal of Population Economics. 
25(2): 569-90. 
Blake, C.G., S.D. Saleh, and H.H. Whorms. 1996. “Stress and Satisfaction as a Function of 
Technology and Supervision Type,” International Journal of Operations & Production 
Management, 16(5): 64-73. 
Case, Ann and Angus Deaton. 2005. “Broken Down by Work and Sex: How Our Health 
Declines,” in Analyses in the Economics of Aging, ed. by David Wise, Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 185-212. 
Cooper, C.L. and J. Marshall. 1976. “Occupational Sources of Stress: A Review of the Literature 
Relating to Coronary Heart Disease and Mental Ill-Health.” Journal of Occupational 
Psychology, 49: 11-28. 
Cooper, D., W.D. McCausland, and I. Theodossiou. 2008. “Unemployed, Uneducated, and Sick: 
The Effects of Socio-economic Status on Health Duration in the European Union,” 
Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series A: Statistics in Society, 171(4): 939-52. 
Cornelissen, Thomas, John S. Heywood, and Uwe Jirjahn. 2011. “Performance Pay, Risk 
Attitudes and Job Satisfaction,” Labour Economics, 18: 229-39. 
Cox, D.R. 1972. “Regression Models and Life Tables,” Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, 
Series B 34: 187-220. 
Dohmen, Thomas and Armin Falk. 2011. “Performance Pay and Multidimensional Sorting:  
Productivity, Preferences, and Gender,” American Economic Review 101(2): 556-90. 
Fletcher, Jason M., Jody L. Sindelar, and Shintaro Yamaguchi. 2011. “Cumulative Effects of Job 
Characteristics on Health,” Health Economics 20: 553-70. 
Foster, Andrew D. and Mark R. Rosenzweig. 1994. “A Test for Moral Hazard in the Labor 
Market: Contractual Arrangements, Effort, and Health,” Review of Economics and 
Statistics 74: 213-27. 
Freeman, Richard D. and Morris Kleiner. 2005. “The Last American Shoe Manufactures: 
Decreasing Productivity and Increasing Profits in a Shift from Piece Rates to Continuous 
Flow Production,” Industrial Relations 44: 307 – 330. 
Grund, Christian and Dirk Sliwka. 2010. “Evidence on Performance Pay and Risk Aversion,” 
Economics Letters, 102: 8-11. 
Heckman, J. and G. Borjas. 1990. “Does Unemployment Cause Future Unemployment? 
Definitions, Questions and Answers from a Continuous Time Model of Heterogeneity 
and State Dependence,” Economica, 47: 247–83. 
Jenkins, S. 1995. “Easy Estimation Methods for Discrete-Time Duration Models,” Oxford 
Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 57(1): 129-138.  
Jenkins S. (2004) “Discrete time (grouped data) proportional hazards models”, (Available from 




Jenkins, S. (2005) Discrete time (grouped data) proportional hazard models. Institute for Social 
and Economic Research, University of Essex, Colchester. 
http://fmwww.bc.edu/RePEc/bocode/h/hshaz.hlp (last accessed 05/3/2013)).  
Jenkins, S. (2013) Survival Analysis, manuscript, 
https://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/files/teaching/stephenj/ec968/pdfs/ec968lnotesv6.pdf, (last 
accessed 12/3/2013).  
Khwaja, Ahmed, Frank Sloan and Martin Salm. 2006. “Evidence on Preferences and Subjective 
Beliefs of Risk Takers: The Case of Smokers,” International Journal of Industrial 
Organization 24: 667-82 
Kowert, P.A. and M.G. Hermann. 1997. “Who Takes Risks? Daring and Caution in Foreign 
Policy Making,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 41: 611–37. 
Lancaster, T. 1979. “Econometric Methods for the Duration of Unemployment,” Econometrica, 
47(4): 939-956. 
Lazear, Edward P. 2000. “Performance Pay and Productivity,” American Economic Review 90: 
1346 – 61. 
Lia, Shu and Chang-Jiang Liu. 2008. “Individual Differences in a Switch from Risk-Averse 
Preferences for Gains to Risk-Seeking Preferences for Losses: Can Personality Variables 
Predict the Risk Preferences?” Journal of Risk Research 11: 673–86.   
MacDonald, Glenn and Leslie M. Marx. 2001. “ Adverse Specialization,” Journal of Political 
Economy 109: 864 – 99. 
Meyer, B.D. 1990. “Unemployment Insurance and Unemployment Spells,” Econometrica 58(4): 
757-782. 
Monaco, Kristen and Emily Williams. 2000. “Assessing the Determinants of Safety in the 
Trucking Industry,” Journal of Transportation and Statistics 3: 69 – 80. 
Mullahy, John and Stephanie A. Robert. 2010. “No Time to Lose: Time Constraints and Physical 
Activity in the Production of Health,” Review of the Economics of the Household 8: 409-
32. 
Nicholson, N., E. Soane, M. Fenton-O’Creevy and P. Willman. 2005. “Personality and Domain-
Specific Risk Taking,” Journal of Risk Research 8: 157–76. 
Prentice, R. and L. Gloeckler. 1978. “Regression Analysis of Grouped Survival Data with 
Application to Breast Cancer Data,” Biometrics 34: 57-67.  
Rodriquez, Daniel A., Filipe Targa and Michael Belzer. 2006. “Pay Incentives and Truck Driver 
Safety: a Case Study,” Industrial and Labor Relations Review 59: 205 – 225. 
Saha, Asim, Takiar Tamnath, Ramendra Chaudhuri and Habibullah Saiyed. 2004. “An Accident-
Risk Assessment Study of Temporary Piece Rated Workers,” Industrial Health 42: 240 – 
45. 
Smith, Adam, 1776. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations as reprinted 
in 1909, edited by C. J. Bullock, P.F. Collier & Son: New York. 
Sundstroem-Frisk, Carin. 1984. “Behavioral Control through Piece-rate Wages,” Journal of 
Occupational Accidents 6: 49-59. 
Toupin, Dominic, Luc LeBel, Denise Dubeau, Daniel Imbeau and Luc Bouthiller. 2007. 
“Measuring the Productivity and Physical Workload of Brushcutters within the Context 
of a Production-Based Pay System,” Forest Policy and Economics 9: 1046 – 55. 
Williamson, Ann, Philip Bohle, Michael Quinlan, and David Kennedy. 2009. “Short Trips and 
Long Days: Safety and Health in Short-Haul Trucking,” Industrial and Labor Relations 
25 
 
Review 62: 415-29. 
Viscusi, W. Kip. 2001. “Cigarette Smokers as Job Risk Takers,” The Review of Economics and 
Statistics 83: 269-80. 
26 
 
Table 1.  Selected Results for Hazard Ratios for Overall Subjective Health: Odds Ratio on Percentage of Time Spent 
in Performance Pay  
  Prentice-Gloeckler 



















































Notes: z-statistics under odds ratios.  All regressions also include a constant and indicators for gender, 
noncompletion of secondary education (excluded), completion of secondary education, completion of postsecondary 
education, age less than 26 (excluded), age between 26-35, age between 36-45, age between46-55, age above 55, 
married, currently smoking, labour income quartile, the log of hours worked, broad industry and occupation and 
region where the P-G regressions also include log of time.  Numbers under odds ratios are asymptotic z-statistics.  *, 
**, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level. The sample is those people who were 
working in wage and salary jobs for the entire time we observe them and who start out with excellent or very good 
subjective health in wave eight.  For the overall sample, there are 2,410 observations where 51% are censored. 
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Table 2.  Hazard ratios for the Percentage of Time Spent in Performance Pay by Objective Health Measure   
  Prentice-Gloeckler 
Sample Cox w/o Frailty w/ Frailty 

























































































































































Notes:  Same covariates as in Table 1.  Numbers under hazard ratios are asymptotic z-statistics.  *, ** and *** 
indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively.  Sample sizes are given above. 
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Table 3.  Selected Ordered Probit Regression Results for Coefficient on Percentage of Time 
Spent in Performance Pay 
Leisure Activity Sample Coefficient 
Sports Healthy workers -0.019 
(-0.27) 
 All workers -0.017 
(-0.41) 
Evening classes (incl keep fit) Healthy workers -0.043 
(-0.55) 
 All workers 0.009 
(0.18) 
Drink Healthy workers 0.148** 
(2.22) 
 All workers 0.134*** 
(3.34) 
Eat Out Healthy workers 0.123* 
(1.90) 
 All workers 0.130*** 
(3.36) 
Notes:  Regressions based on data on wage and salary workers from Wave 8 of the BHPS.  Other 
covariates include: gender, education, age, age squared, marital status, indicator for currently 
smoking, labour income, occupation and region. 
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Table 4.  GHQ: Stress Results.  Hazard Ratio on Percentage of Time in Performance Pay by Duration Model and 
Sample 
  Prentice-Gloeckler 























































































































































































































































































































Notes:  Duration model starts with respondents in Wave 8 saying that they have GHQ difficulty ‘not at all’ or ‘no 
more than usual’ or that happiness is ‘much more than usual’ or the ‘same as usual’.  Thus failure happens when the 
respondent reports difficulty ‘rather’ or ‘much’ more than usual.  Frailty controls for log duration (last three time 
31 
 
periods combined). Regressions based on data on wage and salary workers from Wave 8 of the BHPS.  Other 
covariates include those in Table 3.  Sample sizes given in table. 
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Figure 1. Survival Plots for Subjective Health 
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Appendix Table A1:  Full Results for Subjective Health for Full Sample: Cox, P-G with and without Frailty:  Odds 
Ratios 
  Prentice-Gloeckler 
Variable Cox Regression without Frailty with Frailty 




























































































































































Notes:  z-statistics under odds ratios.  Regressions also include a constant term.  The excluded variables are: did not 
complete secondary education, age under 26 years, income in 4th quartile, skilled nonmanual occupation, regions of 
England, Wales and Northern Ireland that are not in greater London or in Scotland, and services and banking 
industry.  *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. 
 
36 
 
